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Abstract
According to Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Lin and Wu (2014), a high degree of earnings management (EM) 
is associated with a poor quality of information. In this sense, it is possible to assume that the financial data of 
companies that manage earnings can present different patterns from those with low degree of EM. The aim of this 
exploratory study is to test whether a financial data set (operating expenses) of companies with high degree of EM 
presents bias. For this analysis, we used the model of Kothari and the modified model of Jones (“Dechow model” 
hereafter) to estimate the degree of EM, and we used the logarithmic distribution of data predicted by the Benford’s 
Law to detect abnormal patterns of digits in number sets. The sample was composed of 845 international listed non-
financial companies for the year 2010. To analyze the discrepancies between the actual and expected frequencies of 
the significant-digit, two statistics were calculated: Z-test and Pearson’s chi-square test. The results show that, with 
a confidence level of 90%, the companies with a high degree of EM according to the Kothari model presented similar 
distribution to that one predicted by the Benford’s Law, suggesting that, in a preliminary analysis, their financial data 
are free from bias. On the other hand, the data set of the organizations that manage earnings according to the Dechow 
model presented abnormal patterns. The Benford´s Law has been implemented to successfully detect manipulated 
data. These results offer insights into the interactions between EM and patterns of financial data, and stimulate new 
comparative studies about the accuracy of models to estimate EM. 
Keywords: Earnings management (EM). Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ). Benford’s Law.
O elo entre gerenciamento de resultado e padrão digital
Resumo
Conforme Dechow e Dichev (2002) e Lin e Wu (2014), um alto grau de gerenciamento de 
resultados (GR) está associado a uma qualidade informacional pobre. Nesse sentido, é possível 
assumir que os dados financeiros de empresas que gerenciam resultados podem apresentar 
padrões diferentes daquelas com um baixo grau de GR. O objetivo deste estudo exploratório 
foi testar se um conjunto de dados financeiros (despesas operacionais) de empresas com alto 
grau de GR apresentam viés. Para esta análise, utilizou-se o modelo de Kothari e o modelo 
modificado de Jones (“modelo Dechow”) para estimar o grau de GR e foi usada a distribuição 
logarítmica de dados predita pela Lei de Benford para detectar padrões digitais anormais em 
um conjunto numérico. A amostra foi composta por 845 empresas não financeiras listadas em 
bolsas de valores no ano de 2010. Para analisar as discrepâncias entre as frequências atuais e 
esperadas do dígito chamado de significativo, dois testes estatísticos foram realizados: o teste 
Z e o teste Qui-Quadrado. Os resultados mostraram que, com um nível de confiança de 90%, 
as empresas com alto grau de GR conforme o modelo de Kothari apresentaram distribuição 
similar àquela predita pela Lei de Benford, sugerindo que, em uma análise preliminar, esses 
dados não possuem viés. Por outro lado, o conjunto de dados das organizações que gerenciam 
resultados conforme o modelo Dechow apresentaram padrões anormais. A Lei de Benford 
tem sido implementada com sucesso para detectar dados manipulados. Esses resultados 
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oferecem novos elementos sobre as interações entre GR e padrões de dados financeiros, além 
de estimular novos estudos comparativos sobre a acurácia de modelos para se estimar o GR.
Palavras-chave: Gerenciamento de resultados (GR). Qualidade dos Relatórios Financeiros 
(QRF). Lei de Benford. 
1 INTRODUCTION
Financial reports offer relevant elements for the analysis of companies’ 
assets and economic balance. The financial information disclosed by entities of any 
nature must meet standards of quality in order to meet the different expectations 
of their users. Thus, the reliability of the financial data is an important factor for 
reducing the informational asymmetry between companies and their stakeholders.
According to Dechow and Dichev (2002), a high degree of earnings 
management (EM) is associated with a poor quality of information, and therefore it 
is a relevant issue for external users of accounting information.
According to Leclerc et al. (1996, p. 224), the role of auditing is “[…] to add credibility 
to financial statements and to enhance the effectiveness of accounting communication 
needed by our economic system.” Under this perspective, the auditing can increase the 
confidence level of information disclosed. Statistical tests can be used by auditors as analytical 
procedures in the planning stages of the audit (NIGRINI; MITTERMAIER, 1997).
Benford’s Law (BL) is a useful logarithmic distribution for detecting abnormal 
patterns in sets of numbers and it has been applied in different areas of knowledge to 
analyze the frequency of data sets. With the improvement of computational resources, 
the BL had its use increasingly simplified and practices preliminary audit has shown a 
simple and effective tool for detecting evidence of errors, illegal or untoward events, 
such as fraud and managing for results (NIGRINI, 2005).
The general aim of this exploratory study is to test whether a financial 
variable (operating expenses) of companies with a high degree of EM presents 
bias according the data distribution predicted by Benford’s Law. In this sense, the 
research question of this study is: Do the companies with a high degree of earnings 
management have bias in their financial data?
Considering that there is a gap in the literature regarding the quality of 
financial information and detection of bias in companies that manage earnings, it is 
expected that the results of this study contribute to this subject and can foster new 
investigations in different entities and regions.
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL REPORTING 
QUALITY
2.1 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT (EM)
Accounting scandals that have hit the headlines in the last decade (notably 
those involving Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and Merck) have generated increasing 
mistrust among investors regarding the relevance and reliability of published 
accounting information. In this respect, the earnings management issue has become 
a concern throughout the world (ISLAM; ALI; AHMAD, 2011). Precisely, the 
separation between ownership and control can be considered the starting point of EM, 
 which is viewed as a variety of agency cost (DAVIDSON; XIE; XU, 2004). As Ball 
(2013) noted, given the conflict of interest shareholder versus manager, the cost to be 
borne by managers for manipulating the result is less than the cost that shareholders 
have to bear for detecting and penalizing such management. Moreover, because 
of agency conflict, the existence of asymmetric information makes it particularly 
difficult for investors to know the real situation of companies (LIN; WU, 2014). 
This problem is associated with the different availability of information between 
diverse participants (AKERLOF, 1970). In accordance with them, company 
directors, acting for their own benefit, carry out actions aimed, not just against 
shareholders’ interests, in the form of non-optimal investment decisions, but also 
against those of other interest groups, in order to influence contractual outcomes 
(HEALY; WAHLEN, 1999; SCOTT, 2009).
According to García-Osma, Noguer e Clemente (2005), EM can be defined 
as any practice carried out intentionally by company managers, for opportunistic 
and/or information purposes, to report accounting results that do not correspond 
to those really achieved. These authors stress that such actions may be either 
opportunistic or information-related, as proposed also by Schipper (1989), who 
remained on the sidelines of the debate as to whether EM constitutes exclusively 
practices that violate generally accepted accounting principles or whether managers 
may use their discretionary powers, overstating or understating results, without 
violating these principles. In accordance with Gao (2013) managers could engage 
in EM activities to influence the characteristics of a transaction without improving 
its economic substance. But it is necessary to note that this EM can distort the 
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financial picture of the firm (, 2013). With increasing managerial discretion by EM 
actions, thus distorting the signal value of earnings, the earnings quality and then, 
the financial reporting quality is reduced (NELSON; SKINNER, 2013).
Earnings Management practices are proxied by management accruals 
(AEM) and real measures (REM) in order to determine whether results vary 
depending on earnings practices. Although the choice of one EM instrument 
or another depends on various factors – the aim pursued, the accounting rules 
applicable and business-sector characteristics, among others (GARCÍA-OSMA; 
NOGUER; CLEMENTE, 2005; DATTA; ISKANDAR-DATTA; SINGH, 2013) – 
managers prefer instruments which are readily available and low cost, like AEM, or, 
in contrast, selected REM instruments that are less visible to investors, the market, 
auditors and other stakeholders. EM via discretionary accruals is a manager›s 
instrument for changing shareholders and stakeholders’ expectations (Maranjory 
et al., 2013).
Managers can choose between AEM and REM actions according to which 
ones are less costly and less visible to investors and to the market (KIM; LISIC; 
PEVZNER, 2011). According to Zang (2012), decisions to manage earnings 
through “real” actions precede those to manage earnings through accruals. REM 
could be detrimental to firms’ competitiveness and future value (GARCÍA-
OSMA; NOGUER; CLEMENTE, 2005). However, it has been suggested that 
the manipulation of real activities is also widespread (GRAHAM; HARVEY; 
RAJGOPAL, 2005) because it is more difficult for auditors and regulatory bodies 
to detect REM than AEM, because REM is associated with operating, investing and 
financing activities (COHEN; ZAROWIN, 2010).
Managers have diverse reasons for manipulating accounting results. Thus, 
according to Roychowdhury (2006), real activities are misreported in order to avoid 
reporting annual losses, while Gargouri, Shabou and Francoeur (2010), in their 
study of Canadian companies, found that managers may seek to smooth out income 
flows, to minimise the tax burden, to effect changes in the control of the company, to 
influence labour negotiations or to respond to takeover bids. Moreover, in accordance 
with Hazarika, Karpoffet and Nahata (2012), managers could be tending to distort 
their firms’ reported financial performance in order to increase their compensation 
and gains through stock sales (BURGSTAHLER; DICHEV, 1997; GUNNY, 2010). 
In order to summarize these motivations, Healy and Wahlen (1999) classified these 
motivations as contractual, political/governmental and valuation-based.
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Firstly, in relation to contractual motivations, the higher the debt ratio 
of a company, the more likely that its managers will select accounting practices 
that transfer future profits to the present (KIM; LISIC; PEVZNER, 2011). This 
tendency is heightened when managers have signed remuneration contracts related 
to company results (HEALY, 1985; HOLTHAUSEN; LARCKERET; SLOAN, 
1995). Moreover, as Franz, Hassabelnaby and Lobo (2012) examined and found, 
firms show a positive correlation between their incentives to EM actions and the 
proximity to debt covenant violation. Secondly, the greater the political costs facing 
a company, the greater the incentives of management to artificially reduce its profit, 
in order to reduce the potential costs of governmental actions towards the company, 
and thus to manipulate the image offered to the market and to regulatory authorities 
(WATTS; ZIMMERMAN, 1986). Similarly, Monterre Mayoral and Sánchez Segura 
(2008) studied how taxes affect the quality of the accounting result and reported 
that in the case of companies that are not highly indebted, rising taxes generate a 
tendency for profits to be massaged down. Meanwhile, Cahan (1992) examined 
EM behaviour by companies facing antitrust and import-relief investigations, and 
found, empirically, that managers had incentives to use accounting procedures 
that reflected lower levels of income than for the periods not being investigated. 
However, managers are sensitive to future stock performance and those with 
high equity incentives are less likely y to report large positive earnings (CHENG; 
WARFIELD, 2005). 
And finally, related to asset valuation, numerous studies have highlighted 
the existence of EM prior to transactions in which valuation is a crucial aspect. As 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) report, firms use real and accrual-based EM activities 
around seasoned equity offerings. Thus, Perry and Williams (1994) observed that 
EM led to profits being understated in periods prior to a management buyout. By 
contrast, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) found that profits were often overstated 
during periods of equity issue. Paulo, Cavalcante and  Lapa de Melo, 2012 found 
that accounting numbers are not significantly different in periods close to the public 
issue of shares and debentures, pointing that this fact does not affect the quality 
of accounting information. Another question of interest is that of management 
changes. In this respect, there are opportunistic interests both for managers leaving 
a company and for those joining it. As shown by DeAngelo (1988), managers who 
believe their position within the company is being challenged have an incentive 
to overstate the accounting result, while those who are newly arrived will seek to 
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understate profits in their first year in order to shift responsibility for this situation 
to the former management and to make subsequent results appear more impressive. 
The consequences of these management practices are beyond doubt 
detrimental, reducing the value of the company, its assets, its transactions, its 
reputation and corporate image (FOMBRUN; GARDBERG; BARNETT, 2000; 
ROYCHOWDHURY, 2006). According to Zahra, Priem e Rasheed (2005), the 
consequences of these discretionary practices affect investors, employees, customers 
and the local communities, which is eventually reflected in corporate reputation 
and, hence, the market value.  Improvements in Earnings Quality lower information 
asymmetry and affect the cost of capital (FRANCIS et al., 2005; BHATTACHARYA; 
DAOUK; WELKER 2003; BLANCO; GARCÍA; TRIBÓ, 2009). At this respect, 
as Ferrero, Banerjee and García-Sánchez (2013) and Martínez-Ferrero, Banerjee 
and García-Sánchez (2014) report, EM practices leads to higher costs of capital and 
lower reputation, as result of the perceived uncertainty resulting in a discounting 
of the value of the information reported by the company engaging in EM practices. 
At the same time, provoking a loss of support among shareholders, investors and 
other stakeholders, and increasing activism and surveillance by interest groups and 
regulatory authorities (ZAHRA; PRIEM; RASHEED, 2005).
2.2 FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY (FRQ)
Due to the markets and business globalization, geographical expansion and 
the greater demand for information and transparency among investors, stakeholders 
and society in general, market agents find their toehold in the quality of their financial 
reporting and their main source of knowledge on company strategy (MARTÍNEZ-
FERRERO, 2014). In relation to Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ), let us first 
note that the goal of financial reporting is to provide useful information for decision-
making. So, according to Navarro-Garcia and Madrid-Guijarro (2014), “[...] the 
main purpose of financial reporting is to provide information that better reflects 
the economic position and performance of companies.” However, even though 
companies may generate financial statements in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, these statements may present differing levels of quality 
(CHOI; PAE, 2011). Nonetheless, companies tend to improve their accounting 
practices from the moment that standards can be voluntarily applied (NAVARRO-
GARCIA; MADRID-GUIJARRO, 2014). 
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Precisely, as FRQ can be defined as the faithfulness of the information 
conveyed by the financial reporting process. This quality may be influenced by 
factors related to taxes, dividends and objectives other than those regarding the 
information needs of external providers of capital (BALL; SHIVAKUMAR, 2005; 
BURGSTAHLER; HAIL; LEUZ, 2006). Reporting is a final output, but the 
quality of the output depends on each of the parts of the process by which it is 
elaborated, including disclosures about the company’s transactions, the selection 
and application of accounting policies, the judgments involved in this respect and 
the estimates made (JONAS; BLANCHET, 2000).
The financial report shows the economic and financial situation of the 
company, in order to inform managers and shareholders (MATHEWS; PERERA, 
1991; MONEVA; LLENA, 2000), and is of crucial importance in decision making, 
when the interests of both shareholders and creditors must be taken into account. 
FRQ requires companies to voluntarily expand the scope and quality of the 
information they report, to ensure that market participants are fully informed in 
order to make well-grounded decisions on investment, credit, etc. This high quality 
information facilitates greater transparency. Thereon, reporting quality is achieved 
when the information reported to investors and to the market is credible and free 
of error and bias, whether they are intentional or not (LU; RICHARDSON; 
SALTERIO, 2011). Therefore, the scope and quality of reported information are 
expanded and market participants are fully informed (HOPE; THOMAS; VYAS, 
2013). 
According to the leading authorities on the evaluation of financial reporting 
(such as the FASB, the SEC or the Jenkins committee), the main characteristics 
required are relevance, reliability, transparency and clarity (JONAS; BLANCHET, 
2000; LU; RICHARDSON; SALTERIO, 2011). It has been asserted that high 
quality accounting information is a valuable means of counteracting information 
asymmetry (CHEN et al., 2011). 
Numerous advantages of providing high-quality information have been 
cited: FRQ reduces information risk and liquidity (Lambert et al., 2007), prevents 
managers from using discretionary powers for their own benefit and helps them 
take efficient investment decisions (CHEN; BOUVAIN, 2009). Lambert, Leuz 
e Verrecchia (2007) obtained empirical evidence that the quality of accounting 
information can influence the cost of capital, both directly, by affecting market 
participants’ perceptions about the distribution of future cash flows, and indirectly, 
by affecting real decisions that alter the distribution of future cash flows above. In 
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this sense, Bachoo, Tan and Wilson (2013) obtained evidence which shows how the 
quality of reporting is negatively linked with cost of equity capital, and positively 
linked with the expected level of future long-term earnings. Chen and Bouvain 
(2009) found that FRQ positively affects the investment efficiency of private firms 
in emerging markets and that this effect enhances bank financing and decreases 
incentives to minimise earnings for tax avoidance purposes.
The external indicators of FRQ are: SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs); Restatements; and finally; internal controls 
(DECHOW; GE; SCHRAND, 2010). The two last indicators are the most important 
because they show information about the quality of the financial statements as a 
whole and not just as earnings. The main consequences of these alternatives are their 
effect on the cost of capital (market reaction to announcements of restatements and/
or AAERs is negative). Francis et al. (2005), supporting this point of view, reported 
that firms with a higher earning quality have a lower cost of debt.
2.3 RELIABILITY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
The four main attributes listed by the International Accounting Standard 
Board to make financial statements useful to users are: understandability, 
relevance, comparability and reliability (INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD, 2011).
The information that can influence the decisions of users by helping them 
to understand the operational and financial context of the organization and evaluate 
the impact of previous, current or future transactions and events, must be reliable, 
i.e., it has to be verifiable and free of errors and biases (INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 2011).
From the perspective of auditors, reliability refers to the probability of 
achieving the same results when analytical tests are again performed or when the 
same information is obtained from different sources. Reliable results are thus “[…] 
consistent, and are minimally affected by random errors of measurement.” (THE 
CANADIAN AUDITING AND ASSURANCE STANDARDS BOARD, 2011, 
p. 20). In order to verify the consistency and lack of errors and bias of a data set, 
statistical tests are used regularly by auditors and other analysts.
Digital analysis, which is often used in the audit testing, allows finding 
abnormal patterns of numbers, wrong digit combinations and rounding of numbers 
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in financial information. According to Durtschi, Hillison and Pacini (2004), one of 
the most effective tools for digital analysis is the Benford’s Law, which gives auditors 
the expected frequencies of digits in a given data set. The Benford’s Law has been 
implemented to successfully detect manipulated data (RAUCH; GOETTSCHE; 
EL MOUAAOUY, 2013; HENSELMANN; DITTER; SCHERR, 2013). In recent 
studies, numerous scholars have employed Benford’s law to investigate earnings 
management in enterprises. So, in accordance with Lin and Wu (2014), Benford’s 
law has been widely employed in accounting audits and when examining whether 
companies carry out EM actions. In this way, Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997) assert 
that, if an examined distribution of data fitted well with the BL, auditors might 
conclude that the respective data passed a test of reasonableness. This fact does not 
mean, necessarily, that all the observed numbers are correct or authentic, but rather 
that any bias or errors were not significant enough to affect the digital standards 
expected. According to Nigrini (2005) even if auditors have to combine other 
complementary analytical procedures and more accurate methods, BL constitutes 
a powerful tool in preliminary analysis to detect errors and other inconsistencies in 
data sets.
Moreover, given the divergence between the observed first digits distribution 
in annual financial accounts, Amiram, Bozanic and Rouen (2014) evidenced that 
when these financial statements are managed, there is a high likelihood of an 
increase in the divergence from Benford’s Law. So, these authors conclude that 
Benford’s Law could be understood as a long-range tool to detect financial reporting 
irregularities.
2.4 BENFORD’S LAW
Benford’s Law, also known as Law of Anomalous Numbers, Law of 
Significant Digits or Newcomb-Benford’s Law, is a logarithmic distribution useful 
for detecting abnormal patterns in sets of numbers. The deviation in actual data 
from these expected frequencies indicates the presence of manipulation (THOMAS, 
2012). The innovative paper, written by Newcomb (1881), contributed to the 
theoretical explanation of  Benford (1938) about the first-digit distribution, which 
is based on the probability of occurrence of a given initial digit, expressed by the 
following formula: 
(1)
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 Thus, the probability of occurrence of a specific number in a data set, whose 
first digit is 1, is equal to 30.12%, considering Pe(1)=log102=0.3012. Similarly, the 
probability to find numbers whose first digit is 2, is equal to 17.61%, considering 
Pe(2)=log10(3/2)=0.1761, and so on, until Pe(9)=log10(10/9)=0.0458. Additionally, 
Hill (1995) provided a robust mathematical basis for this distribution. From the 
second to the fifth digits, the logarithmic behavior of the predicted frequencies is 
reduced each time and the deviations from a linear distribution tend to disappear 
progressively after the second digit. The probability of occurrence of a number 
between 0 to 9 for the fifth digit is equal to 10%.
An important property of BL, commented by Pinkham (1961), is scale 
invariance, since if a data set is multiplied by a constant factor, the new data set also 
obey the law. For example, a shift from dollar-denominated data to data denominated 
in other currencies does not change the first-digit distribution predicted by BL.
Benford’s Law, however, is not applicable to all data sets, such as those 
related to randomly generated numbers whose probability of occurrence of the 
digits is the same for the entire set. In addition, dates or pre-defined numbers, such 
as phone numbers, bank account numbers or non-sequential registries, also fail to 
satisfy BL.
On the other hand, in all other cases when the BL is applicable, the lack 
of conformity between the observed and expected occurrences suggests, in a 
preliminary way, abnormalities that should be investigated to know whether the 
cause is related to contextual factors, unintentional or intentional actions.
Hürlimann (2006) pointed out that by the year 2006 there were 305 papers 
directly related to BL published in scientific journals, and around 90 per cent of these 
texts were written after 1990. Despite this, there are few papers in the literature about 
BL applied to organizations of the health sector, such as the investigation of Maher 
and Akers (2002) on fraud in the insurance industry and the research of Wiseman 
(2011), to detect deviations and operational errors in hospital procedures. Most of 
the papers related to the application of BL in forensic accounting and auditing were 
published after the mid-1990s by authors such as Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997), 
Durtschi, Hillison and Pacini (2004), Quick and Wolz (2005), Johnson (2009) and 
Geyer (2010), among others. Basically, authors emphasized the relevance of the first 
digit in relation to other digits. Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997) stated that the other 
digits can be analyzed to support more specific audit tests according to the designed 
purposes, but the most significant one is the first. 
362
R
A
C
E
, U
no
es
c,
 v
. 1
4,
 n
. 1
, p
. 3
51
-3
82
, j
an
./a
br
. 2
01
5
Jennifer Martínez Ferrero, Beatriz Cuadrado Ballesteros, Marco Antonio Figueiredo Milani Filho
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
In this study, we used a quantitative approach to analyze the financial data 
of selected companies, particularly those ones that manage earnings. The sample is 
constituted of 845 international listed non-financial companies for the tax year 2010. 
The respective sample was obtained from the information available in Thomson 
One Analytic database for accounting and financial data related to 25 countries 
(USA, United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, France, 
Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Japan, China, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Korea) and the Administrative Region of Hong Kong.
Concretely, the financial information corresponds to consolidated data of 
the analyzed companies. Moreover, the financial data were directly related to the 
operating account, which values encompass the total expenses for each institution. 
The information provided by Thomson One Analytic database is expressed in 
millions of Euros. Therefore, there is no conflict in the valuation of each item 
caused by using a sample of international companies.
According to the Dechow model, 208 companies presented a high degree 
of earning management in the period. The Kothari model, and its turn, detected the 
same 208 plus 154 companies, for a total of 362 companies with a high EM degree. 
We found 483 companies that presented a medium or low EM degree according to 
the both models applied.
3.1 JONES’ STANDARD MODEL 
According to Jones (1991) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), total 
accrual adjustments (TAA) are defined as:
                                                                                      (2)
Where  represents the change in current assets;  reflects the change in cash 
held and short term financial investments;  is the change in current liabilities;  is the 
change in reclassified long term obligations;  is the depreciation and amortization; i 
represents each company and t represents the year.
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On the basis of Equation 2, accruals are calculated using an explanatory 
model. The difference between present and expected accrual adjustments (taking 
into account growth, company assets and the accounting result) represents the 
discretionary or unexplained component of accrual adjustments (DAA) and acts as a 
measure of management discretion in the reporting of results.
The standard Jones model uses the following procedure to separate the 
discretionary from the non-discretionary component:
                                                                                      (3)
Where  are the total accrual adjustments;  represents total assets 
of firm i in period t-1 and this is used as a deflator to correct possible problems 
of heteroscedasticity;  represents the property, plant and equipment of 
firm i in period t;  is the change in sales for firm i in period t. The non-
discretionary accrual adjustments (NDAA) are  and  represents the discretionary 
accrual adjustments (DAA) for firm i in the year t. NDAA are calculated by replacing 
the coefficients in Equation 3 with the values obtained by Ordinary Least Squares 
and DAA are the residuals of this calculation.
3.2 MODIFIED JONES MODEL (DECHOW; SLOAN; 
SWEENEY, 1995)
In the modified Jones model (DECHOW; SLOAN; SWEENEY, 1995) 
(Equation 4), the TAA use the variation in sales less accounts receivable (used to 
measure the growth of the company, as its working capital is closely linked to sales), and 
less the item property, plant and equipment, which is used to measure the depreciation 
costs contained in the discretionary adjustments. It is assumed that not all sales are 
necessarily non-discretionary and that this will depend on the item to be received. 
 
 
        (4)
Where A*R represents accounts receivable, and the other variables are as 
defined in Equation 3.
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Note that in this model, the coefficients are calculated using the original 
Jones model (1991) and that the modification is made only for the calculation of the 
non-discretionary adjustments. In this study, we name the modified Jones model as 
“Dechow model”. 
3.3 KOTHARI MODEL
Moreover, we alternatively employ the model proposed by Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005). This is characterised by the incorporation of a non-deflated constant 
and the return on assets, or financial profitability. All variables (except the constant) 
are deflated by the total assets for the previous period and are calculated by cross 
estimation. This model provides increased reliability and higher quality results, by 
resolving the question of whether differences in DAA may derive from differences 
in performance.
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The NDAA are calculated by replacing the coefficients in Equation 6 with 
those obtained from Equation 5, as in the original modified Jones model.
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The DAA are then obtained by subtracting the NDAA from the TAA value 
obtained in Equation 2, as shown in Equation 7. The DAA represent the unexpected or 
abnormal accruals adjustments that constitute the variable taken as a measure of EM.
tititi NDAATAADAA ,,, −=
    
(5)
(6)
(7)
365
R
A
C
E
, U
noesc, v. 14, n. 1, p. 351-382, jan./abr. 2015
The link between...
3.4 MEASURES OF EM AND FRQ
EM is considered to be the inverse of FRQ (DECHOW; DICHEV, 2002); a 
higher degree of EM is associated with lower quality of information (MARTÍNEZ-
FERRERO, BANERJEE, GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ, 2014).
According to García-Osma, Albornoz Noguer and Clemente (2005), EM 
can be defined as “[...] any practice carried out intentionally by company managers, 
for opportunistic and/or information purposes, to report accounting results that do 
not correspond to those really achieved.” The discretionary component of accruals 
adjustment could be used as a measure of management discretionarily, and therefore 
of accounting manipulation. As observed by García-Osma, Albornoz Noguer and 
Clemente (2005), accruals are not all discretionary; hence it is necessary to separate 
the discretionary component from the non-discretionary one in order to determine 
the presence and extent of EM. The discretionary accruals adjustment (DAA) is 
obtained by subtracting the non-discretionary accruals adjustment (NDAA) from 
the total accruals adjustment (TAA). The DAA represents the abnormal accruals 
that constitute the variable taken as a measure of EM.
In this study, in accordance with Martínez-Ferrero, Garcia‐Sanchez and 
Cuadrado‐Ballesteros (2013) and Martínez-Ferrero, Prado-Lorenzo Fernández-
Fernández (2013), we use the modified Jones model (DECHOW; SLOAN; 
SWEENEY, 1995) and the Kothari model (KOTHARI; LEONE; WASLEY, 2005) 
to separate the non-discretionary component of accruals from the discretionary one. 
Despite the modified Jones model, in Kothari model, it is included lagged return on 
assets (ROA) as an additional regressor to control for the effect of performance on 
a firm’s accruals.
3.5 FIRST-DIGIT DISTRIBUTION
In order to detect abnormal digit frequencies in accounting numbers, we 
analyzed only the first-digit distribution, because it is considered a high-level test 
of reasonableness and it is associate with a larger material manipulation of earnings 
(RAUCH; GOETTSCHE; MOUAAOUY, 2013). Second and other digits were 
not subject to analysis for this study.
The first digit of the financial data was identified and organized, aiming to 
know the observed frequency of the specific digit Po(d). Subsequently, the Po(d) was 
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compared to the expected probability of the same digit Pe(d) predicted by the BL, as 
described previously in the  Equation 1.
The null hypothesis (H0) proposes that no statistical significance exists 
between Po(d) and Pe(d), as shown in the Equation 8:
                                                                                                   (8)
We used the Z-test to determine whether the differences between the actual 
and expected proportions are significant, in order to verify the appropriateness of 
accepting or rejecting H0 with significance level (α) equal to 5% and Zcritical equal 
to 1.959. The Equation 9 presents the Z-test (Zt), where n represents the number 
of observations.
                                                                                                                    (9)
According to Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997), the correction term  is 
applied in the Equation 3 when  , as shown in the Equation 10. 
                       
                                                              
(10)
To test the null hypothesis that the frequency distribution (Do) observed 
in the selected sample was consistent with the BL distribution (De), we used the 
statistical test Chi-square (χ2), shown in Equation 11, with a significance level (α) 
equal to 10%, degree of freedom (df) equal to 8, and the critical value (χ2critical) 
equal to 13.362.
                              
                                                        
(11)
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After the appropriate statistical tests, it was possible to verify the conformity 
of the observed distributions to those expected and to infer about the presence or 
absence of bias, by adopting the BL as a proxy for reliability.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the digital analysis performed on the values 
related to operating expenses accounts of 845 observations in the period. The 
results of statistical tests verify the reliability of the financial data of the selected 
companies, using the probability distribution predicted by Benford’s Law as a proxy 
of reliability. Hypothetically, the companies that manage earnings would be more 
propense to present bias in a digital analysis than others.
Significant differences between the predicted and observed data are relevant 
for the detection of non-compliance, and may point out, objectively, the entities that 
would need more detailed analysis to clarify and explain some bias detected.
It is noteworthy that any results of non-compliance to BL not necessarily 
mean that there are cases of fraud or irregularities, which can only be found by 
an in-depth audit. The non-compliance data, however, may be a good indicator of 
attention and it can help to identify relevant factors influencing the performance 
organization.
Compliance to BL, in turn, is not guarantee that there is no risk of fraud or 
errors in the data sets, but represents preliminarily a more favorable situation with 
absence of bias and increasing the degree of reliability of the analyzed data.
4.1 SELECTED COMPANIES USING THE DECHOW MODEL
Graphic 1 shows the observed (Po) and expected (Pe) first-digit frequencies 
of numbers obtained from the operating expenses account of 208 companies with a 
high degree of EM according to the Dechow model. The frequencies of digits 4 and 
5 are higher than expected for the period. This fact is associated with a reduction in 
the frequency of other digits, with emphasis on the digit 7. 
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Graphic 1 – Digital distribution – Companies with high EM according to Dechow Model
Source: the authors.
Table 1 contains the results of the Z-test (Zt), which verifies if there is 
significant difference between the expected (Pe) and observed (Po) probability 
of occurrence of a given initial digit (d) of the revenue account values. The null 
hypothesis (H0) is that there is no significant difference between Pe and Po. After 
analyzing the frequency of occurrence of d, the results indicated that the reference 
value (Zcritical = 1.959) was higher than Zt in all the observations, except for the 
digits 7. This fact allows us to reject H0 for the digit 7 and classify the observed data 
with “attention” status, determining the presence of bias.
                               Table 1 – Digital distribution
d Pe Po Po-Pe Zt status
1 30,1% 27,9% -2,22% 0,55   ok
2 17,6% 17,3% -0,30% 0,07-   ok
3 12,5% 10,1% -2,40% 0,84   ok
4 9,7% 13,9% 4,25% 1,84   ok
5 7,9% 11,1% 3,14% 1,42   ok
6 6,7% 6,7% 0,04% 0,02   ok
7 5,8% 1,9% -3,88% 2,10   attention
8 5,1% 7,2% 2,10% 1,06   ok
9 4,6% 3,8% -0,73% 0,17   ok
Tot 100,0% 100,0% Zcritical=1,959
                               Source: the authors.
369
R
A
C
E
, U
noesc, v. 14, n. 1, p. 351-382, jan./abr. 2015
The link between...
Table 2 shows the Chi-square (χ2) test, calculated as shown in Equation (11) 
for our total sample, in order to verify whether observed (Do) and expected (De) 
data sets have significant differences. The reference value (χ2critical) is compared to 
the calculated value (χ2calc). Due to χ2critical<χ2calc in the period, it is possible to 
reject the null hypothesis (Ho) that there is no significant difference between Do 
and De. This result is also expressed in the relation Pvalue<0.1.
                                                        Table 2 – Test χ2- Dechow’s model
d Do De χ2calc
1 58 63 0,3400
2 36 37 0,0107
3 21 26 0,9571
4 29 20 3,8792
5 23 16 2,5893
6 14 14 0,0004
7 4 12 5,3888
8 15 11 1,7869
9 8 10 0,2420
Tot 208 208 15,194
df=8    χ2crit=13,362   α=0,1
P value  = 0,055
                                                         Source: the authors.
Based on absolute values, the largest differences in the expected frequencies 
occurred in those numbers initiated by the digits 7, 4 and 5. The total difference is 
statistically significant.
Thus, adopting the digital distribution provided by BL as a proxy for 
reliability, statistical tests indicated that, preliminarily, there is bias in the operating 
expenses data of companies with a high degree of EM according to Dechow Model. 
This result is compatible with the argument of Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
Martínez‐Ferrero, Garcia‐Sanchez and Cuadrado‐Ballesteros (2013) and Martínez-
Ferrero, Prado-Lorenzo Fernández-Fernández (2013), that a higher degree of EM is 
associated with lower quality of information.
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4.2 SELECTED COMPANIES USING THE KOTHARI MODEL
Graphic 2 shows the observed (Po) and expected (Pe) first-digit frequencies 
of numbers obtained from the operating expenses account of 362 companies with a 
high degree of EM according to the Kothari model. We found a reasonable fit of Po 
to the logarithmic curve Pe.
Graphic 2 – Digital distribution – with high EM according to Kothari Model
Source: the authors.
The Zt value of the remaining digits in both years studied was less than the 
Zcritical, leading to the acceptance of H0.
                               Table 3 – Digital distribution – Kothari
d Pe Po Po-Pe Zt status
1 30,1% 34,3% 4,15% 1,61   ok
2 17,6% 17,1% -0,48% 0,10   ok
3 12,5% 11,6% -0,89% 0,35   ok
4 9,7% 10,2% 0,53% 0,16   ok
5 7,9% 8,3% 0,37% 0,07   ok
6 6,7% 6,1% -0,62% 0,26   ok
7 5,8% 5,0% -0,83% 0,45   ok
8 5,1% 4,4% -0,70% 0,36   ok
9 4,6% 3,0% -1,54% 1,15   ok
Tot 100,0% 100,0% Zcritical=1,959
                Source: the authors.
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The Chi-square (χ2) test, shown in Table 4, allows accepting the null 
hypothesis (Ho) that there is no significant difference between the observed (Do) 
and expected (De) data sets of the selected companies in the period. The reference 
value (χ2critical) was higher than the calculated value (χ2calc) in both years, as well as 
the P value was higher than the significance level of 10%.
                                
                                             Table 4 – Test χ2- expenditures ON (2009-10)
d Do De χ2calc
1 124 109 2,0722
2 62 64 0,0478
3 42 45 0,2304
4 37 35 0,1049
5 30 29 0,0623
6 22 24 0,2061
7 18 21 0,4267
8 16 19 0,3422
9 11 17 1,8691
Tot 362 362 5,3617
df=8    χ2crit=13,362   α=0,1
P value  = 0,718
                                               Source: the authors.
Based on the χ2 test results, the analyzed data sets can be considered free of 
bias, and this suggests that the Kothari model does not offer, with a confidence level 
of 90%, a clear association between companies that manage earnings with lower 
quality of financial information (operational expenses). This may be related to the 
fact that the group of companies identified by the Kothari model with a high degree 
of earnings management is more comprehensive than the Dechow’s and hence the 
Kothari’s could not point accurately to the relationship between EM and FRQ just 
as Dechow’s. However, this result contrasts with the apparent advantage of Kothari 
model over the Dechow’s regarding the reliability of the information generated, 
according to authors such as Jonas and Blanchet (2000).
4.3 SELECTED COMPANIES WITH LOW EM DEGREE
Graphic 3 presents the observed (Po) and expected (Pe) frequencies of first-
digits of the values obtained from the operating expenses account of companies that 
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presented a low EM degree according to the both models: Dechow and Kothari 
ones. In 2010, despite the slight difference for the digits “2” and “4”, there is a 
reasonable fit of Po (observed frequency) to the logarithmic curve Pe (expected 
frequency).
Graphic 3 – Digital distribution – with low EM
Source: the authors.
Based on the Z-test (Zt) presented in Table 9, there is no significant 
difference between the expected (Pe) and observed (Po) probability of occurrence 
of a given initial digit (d) of the revenue account values, which allows accepting 
H0. Even considering the differences in 2010, related to the digits “2” and “4”, the 
reference value (Zcritical= 1.959) was higher than Zt. Thus, the observed data in 
both years received the ‘ok’ status, suggesting the absence of bias in the data sets.
                              Table 5 – Digital distribution – expenditures – QC (2009-10)
d Pe Po Po-Pe Zt status
1 30,1% 31,1% 0,95% 0,36   ok
2 17,6% 15,1% -2,50% 1,32   ok
3 12,5% 11,6% -0,90% 0,46   ok
4 9,7% 11,6% 1,90% 1,26   ok
5 7,9% 9,3% 1,40% 0,97   ok
6 6,7% 6,4% -0,28% 0,06   ok
7 5,8% 6,2% 0,41% 0,19   ok
8 5,1% 3,7% -1,39% 1,18   ok
9 4,6% 5,0% 0,39% 0,20   ok
Tot 100,0% 100,0% Zcritical=1,959
                               Source: the authors.
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The Chi-square (χ2) test, shown in Table 10, allow accepting the null 
hypothesis (Ho) that there is no significant difference between the observed (Do) 
and expected (De) data sets of the selected companies. The reference value (χ2critical) 
was higher than the calculated value (χ2calc) in both years, as well as the P value was 
higher than the significance level of 10%.
                                              Table 6 – Test χ2 – expenditures - QC (2009-10)
d Do De χ2calc
1 150 145 0,1457
2 73 85 1,7078
3 56 60 0,3129
4 56 47 1,8053
5 45 38 1,1933
6 31 32 0,0551
7 30 28 0,1414
8 18 25 1,8205
9 24 22 0,1632
Tot 483 483 7,3452
df=8    χ2crit=13,362   α=0,1
P value  = 0,499
                                              Source: the authors.
Adopting the digital distribution provided by BL as a proxy for reliability, the Z-test 
and χ2 test results indicated that, preliminarily, there is no bias in the revenue data of companies 
with low EM degree in 2010. This result is compatible with the argument of Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and Martínez‐Ferrero, Garcia‐Sanchez and Cuadrado‐Ballesteros (2013) and 
Martínez-Ferrero, Prado-Lorenzo and Fernández-Fernández (2013).
5 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this exploratory study was to test whether a financial data 
set (operating expenses) of companies that manage earnings presents bias. We 
found that companies with high EM degree, according to the Dechow model, 
have abnormal financial patterns based on the first-digit analysis and this result is 
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compatible with Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Martínez‐Ferrero, Garcia‐Sanchez 
and Cuadrado‐Ballesteros (2013). Interestingly, we also found different results for 
the same test, with a confidence level of 90%, when we considered companies with 
high EM degree calculated by the Kothari model, and this fact contrasts with the 
apparent advantage of Kothari model over the Dechow’s regarding the reliability of 
the information generated.
The companies with low EM degree, according to both models, met the 
frequency expectations predicted by Benford’s Law. This fact suggests that our initial 
hypothesis about the existence of bias in the financial data set (operating expenses) 
can be confirmed using the Dechow model, but not when applying the Kothari 
model. And it is possible to suppose that the Dechow model (or modified Jones 
model) can be more accurate than the Kothari model in order to select companies 
that manage earnings and which financial data would be more propense to present 
bias as we assumed in our hypothesis, based on Martínez-Ferrero, Prado-Lorenzo 
and Fernández-Fernández (2013).
The purpose of this study was not to point out any specific theoretical 
improvement that could be made in the models, but contributes to the conceptual 
discussion of possible advantages and disadvantages of the models in identifying 
companies that manage earnings and brings new questions about the lower 
adherence of Kothari model to Benford’s Law than Dechow model.
Any results of non-compliance to Benford’s Law do not necessarily 
mean that there are cases of fraud or irregularities, but this fact might be a red 
flag and, therefore, a good indicator of attention. An in-depth audit can identify 
relevant factors influencing the respective nonconformity to BL and provide useful 
information to the organization’s stakeholders. On the other hand, compliance to 
BL is not guarantee that there is no risk of fraud or inappropriate actions in the 
data sets, but it is a more favorable condition with absence of bias and increases the 
degree of reliability of the analyzed data.
We suggest for further studies to be carried out by considering other financial 
variables and by increasing the sample size and the consideration of institutional, 
cultural and industry specific factors in order to identify other influences.
Explanatory note
1 The basis of EM practices has been established by the Agency and the Positive Accounting 
theories. The conflict of interest arising from the separation between ownership and control 
(which is the basis of the Agency Theory) and information asymmetry between the two 
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parties create a vacuum where managers behave discretionarily, do not take into account 
shareholders’ interests and carry out EM practices.  Positive Accounting Theory point out 
that accounting choice depends on firm characteristics as it is used to help the relationship 
between the managers and the stakeholders of firms, particularly the investors. 
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